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Cybersecurity and the multistakeholder model
Efforts to study and practice cybersecurity start from the 
premise that cyberspace is governed by an innovative, 
unusual (perhaps unique) ‘multistakeholder’ model. The 
term ‘multistakeholder governance’ came into use in the 
‘internet arena’ around 2004.2 Although there is no clear-cut 
definition of a multistakeholder initiative (MSI), most of the 
diverse initiatives referred to as MSIs are ‘interactive proc-
esses in which business processes are more socially and/or 
environmentally sustainable’.3 The executive coordinator 
for the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) secretariat, Markus 
Kummer, describes multistakeholder governance as a vehicle 
‘for policy dialogue where all stakeholders took part on an 
equal footing’ via a process that is open, inclusive and trans-
parent.4  Further, ‘while multistakeholder participants in the 
World Group on internet governance (WGIG) and IGF meant 
and means that all stakeholders participate on an equal 
footing, it is also clear that in most organizations, intergov-
ernmental or not, there are some structures are in place to 
facilitate decision-making processes.’5 
The features of cyberspace, especially the lack of an authori-
tative role for states in governing and securing it, have led 
scholars and practitioners to conclude that cyberspace pro-
vides an example (perhaps the only one) of multistakeholder 
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2 J. Savage and B. McConnell, B. (2015) Exploring MultiStakeholder Internet 
Governance, EastWest Institute. Available at http://www.ewi.info/idea/
exploring-multi-stakeholder-internet-governance 
3 W.v.Huijstee, (2012). ‘MultiStakeholder Initiatives: A Strategic Guide for 
Civil Society Orga¬nizations’, The Social Science Research Network, SSRN 
2117933. Available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2117933
4 M. Kummer (2013). Multistakeholder Cooperation: Reflections on the 
emergence of a new phraseology in international cooperation, Internet 
Society. Retrieved from their web¬site: http://www.internetsociety.org/
blog/2013/05/multistakeholder-cooperation-reflections-emergence-new-
phraseology-international
5 Ibid.
Summary
Modern society is increasingly dependent upon a well-func-
tioning and secure cyberspace. However, the stability, growth 
and security of this infrastructure are not preordained: they 
must be facilitated. As over 90% of what constitutes cyber-
space today is owned by the private sector they have a large 
role to play. Moreover, cyberspace knows no national bound-
aries, so the securing thereof must be conducted on an in-
ternational scale with close cooperation between states and 
private sectors. This policy brief examines who should be 
involved in securing cyberspace, and how to do so. Coopera-
tion programmes that follow a ‘multistakeholder’ model are 
widely seen as a panacea for securing cyberspace, and the 
model is employed in several current initiatives in the field of 
cybersecurity. However, this policy brief questions whether 
a multistakeholder model is the most appropriate approach. 
Public/private-sector collaboration within a state is essen-
tial, but for this to be effective it must approach the premises 
of the private sector. This policy brief recommends the crea-
tion of a network platform to coordinate efforts between the 
state and the private sector for responding to threats to a 
well-functioning cyberspace.1 
1 ‘Cybersecurity’ concerns threats to a well-functioning cyberspace. The 
threats may come from various types of malware, attacking the codes that 
make up cyberspace. When these codes are changed by actors other than 
those that ‘own’, or have created them, that is an ‘attack’– and can spy 
on, steal, abuse and destroy digital information, even create physical and 
off-line effects. The various ways of altering a code are what separates vi-
ruses and attacks on cyberspace, but the core point is changes to code. 
These vulnerabilities arise not only from intentional agents but also from 
systemic threats that stem from the inherent unpredictability of computers 
and information systems which by themselves ‘create unintended (poten-
tially or actually) dangerous situations for themselves or for the physical 
and human environments in which they are embedded’ (M.Dunn Cavelty, 
2014, Breaking the Cyber-Security Dilemma: Aligning Security Needs and 
Removing Vulnerabilities. Zurich: Springer Science). These threats arise 
from software as well as hardware failures, and cannot be corrected by 
perfecting digital technology and programming: there exists an inherent 
ontological insecurity within computer systems. Cybersecurity is thus the 
response to these threats.
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governance.6 Here ICANN – with responsibility for coordi-
nating the of maintenance of several databases of unique 
identifiers related to the namespaces of the namespaces of 
the Internet,7 and ensuring the network’s stable and secure 
operation – is often cited as an example. This is because it 
seeks to bring all stakeholders together to participate in 
dialogue, decision-making and implementation of solutions 
to its problems or goals, on an equal footing. However, it is 
erroneous to speak of multistakeholder governance of cyber-
space and of multistakeholder securing of cyberspace as a 
single concept. Various different bodies exert authority over 
related but distinct aspects of governing and securing the 
Internet’s technical and structural architecture. Arguably, it 
is in the inaccuracy of seeing governance and the securing 
of cyberspace as a single entity that much of the confusion 
surrounding the possibilities of securing cyberspace through 
a multistakeholder approach originates. 
Viewing multistakeholderism as a teleological goal for all 
aspects of cyberspace governance can create problems. A 
multistakeholder governance model is not appropriate in every 
functional area of governance in cyberspace.8 Keeping cyber-
space operational and secure involves coordination and policy-
making. Identifying an appropriate approach to a responsible 
and efficacious cybersecurity requires determining what types 
of administration are optimal for promoting a balance of inter-
operability, innovation, functionality and operational stability. 
To do so we must understand how cyber security functions 
and who is included in this aspect of cyberspace. Drawing on 
DeNardis’ separation of the securing of cyberspace into task 
and institutional actor can be helpful (see figure).9 
Cybersecurity governance10  
Only a small portion of what is included in securing cyberspace 
is the responsibility of the state, so to talk about a multistake-
holder practice in securing cyberspace is misguided. With over 
90% of cyberspace owned by the private sector, its say and 
impact are tremendous. To date two predominant character-
istics of cybersecurity arrangements can be seen. First, states 
have been generally uninvolved, or involved only as partici-
pants, without superordinate decision-making authority.11 Sec-
ond, decision-making has typically been driven by technical 
and market considerations. One consequence of this is a lack of 
a clear division and understanding of who in government is to 
be involved in securing cyberspace –makes for a cumbersome 
coordination for cooperation with the private sector.
Scholarship on institutionalism in the international sphere 
has focused more on problems of coordination than of coop-
eration.12 The interests of the private industry and the state 
are only partially convergent as regards to securing cyber-
space, and synergy effects are not always easily achieved. For 
one thing, the transparency needed for a multistakeholder 
approach is neither viable nor realistic. From an economic 
perspective the private sector does not wish to openly share 
information on attacks it has experienced in cyberspace and 
detected weaknesses, as sharing this in accordance could 
both lower a company’s credibility and stock value.  Yet, it is 
not that the private sector is reluctant to cooperate with the 
public sector, but the coordination and capability within the 
government that is insufficient. This does not mean that some 
form of coordination between the public and private sector is 
neither possible nor desirable – quite the contrary. In Norway, 
for example, the level of cooperation between the public and 
private sector in governing and securing cyberspace is seen 
as advanced. Nevertheless, the coordination is often ad hoc 
and bilateral (between the government and individual private 
actors), with little overarching strategic planning or facilita-
tion for coordination.  There is great potential for improvement 
on the strategic and political levels, and a clear need for better 
horizontal, vertical and international coordination to secure 
cyberspace. Yet, so far, this has proven difficult to achieve. 
Cooperation and coordination to secure cyberspace
Coordinating a cooperation mechanism between the public 
and private sphere domestically, and being able to commu-
nicate this on the international level, is difficult. Without a 
mechanism for coordinating internally how to cooperate in 
securing cyberspace, it is difficult to establish international 
cross-border cooperation. A mechanism for internal com-
munication between the parties, with a way to communicate 
this outwards on the international level, is lacking in most 
countries. The potential terms for coordination need to 
be re-assessed to improve and elevate the current level of 
6 For a practitioner’s view, see the statements of the current ICANN CEO, Fadi 
Chehade, available at http://www.internetgovernance.org/2012/10/15/
icanns-new-ceo-talks-about-balance-of-power/. For scholarly uses of the 
term multistakeholder governance, see Vint Cerf, Patrick Ryan and Max 
Senges, ‘Internet Governance is Our Shared Responsibility ‘, I/S: A Journal 
of Law and Policy 10 (2014). 
7 As Domain Name System, including policy development for internationali-
zation of the DNS system, introduction of new generic top-level domains 
(TLDs), and the operation of root name servers.
8 M. Dunn Cavelty and M. Suter. (2009) ‘Public–Private Partnerships are no sil-
ver bullet: An expanded governance model for Critical Infrastructure Protec-
tion’, International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, (4): 179–87. 
9 L. DeNardis and M.Raymond (2013), Thinking Clearly About Multistake-
holder Internet Governance (14 November). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.
com/abstract=2354377  
10 From DeNardis and Raymond (2013), ‘Table 1. Disaggregated Internet 
Governance Taxonomy’
11 This feature encapsulates part of what has been referred to as ‘networked 
governance’. See M.L. Mueller, A. Schmidt and B. Kuerbis (2013), ‘Internet 
Security and Networked Governance in International Relations’, Interna-
tional Studies Review, 15 (1): 86–104.  
12 On the implications of these styles of games, see L.L. Martin and B.A. Sim-
mons (1998), ‘Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institu-
tions‘, International Organization 52 (4): 729–57.  
Task
Cybersecurity Regulation/
Enforcement
Designing Encryption Standards
Securing Network Infrastructure
Correcting Software Security 
Vulnerabilities
Software Patch Management
Securing Routing, Addressing, DNS
Responding to Security Problems
Trust Intermediaries Authenticating
Primary institutional actor
National Statutes/Multilateral 
Agreements
Standards-Setting Organizations
ISPs, Network Operators, Private End-
user Networks     
Software Companies
Private End-users
Network Operators, IETF, Registries
CERTs/CSIRTs
Web Site Certificate Authorities
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cooperation. The interest and incentives to progress towards 
strategic planning and facilitation in securing cyberspace 
must come from the private and the public sector. Both sides 
have information and intelligence that the other side needs to 
attract them to the table. In contrast to other public–private 
cooperation, in the sphere of cyberspace the private sector 
has a greater impact, responsibility and say than with other 
commodities where the state cooperates with the private sec-
tor to secure its smooth functioning. Yet, although most of 
what constitutes cyberspace rests with the private sector, the 
responsibility for regulation and enforcement of cybersecu-
rity still lies with the state. To lift cybersecurity to a strategic 
level the parties are dependent on each other, however the 
conditions for such cooperation today are few. A mechanism 
in the form of a network platform that brings together the 
public and private sector in a non-binding gathering could be 
one step towards strengthening cybersecurity through strate-
gic coordination.
Incentive for cooperation through sharing mecha-
nism: a network platform
A network platform that brings together high-level represent-
atives from the public and the private sector can facilitate the 
possibilities for closer and improved public/private-sector 
cooperation in securing cyberspace. Based on the mutual 
benefit of sharing information the network platform can coor-
dinate and create communication between the strategic and 
operational level through facilitating the exchange of infor-
mation, knowledge, expertise and good practices. In this way 
it provides opportunities to all actors involved to influence 
the decision-making process, and brings networking oppor-
tunities. With regular and consistent communication and 
cooperation, information sharing becomes beneficial to both 
parties, improving both the national and international levels 
of cybersecurity. By bringing together high-level stakehold-
ers from the relevant private sectors to communicate with the 
public sector, a unified voice can be established to represent 
the private sector to the public sector, and in turn to inter-
national forums. This can foster improved understanding of 
and between the parties involved. 
A network platform moves towards creating a unified voice in 
securing cyberspace. At international forums, the state can, 
through its foreign ministry, gain information on cyber-attacks 
experienced by the private sector in other countries. This 
information is essential for establishing where new attacks 
may originate, and for identifying the perpetrators. Informa-
tion can also be obtained on what security measures are being 
taken and what ‘holes’ other countries find that need to be 
patched. Since cyberspace operates beyond national bounda-
ries, it is vital for all parties that this information is shared 
internationally. This is necessary for enabling the creation of a 
pre-emptive defence mechanisms and sensors to discover pos-
sible new attacks. And the converse: such information sharing 
must be reciprocated by the private-sector community in other 
countries, based on their experience in securing cyberspace. 
To facilitate this sharing, the public sector can through the 
network platform obtain similar information from the private 
sector in its respective countries, to be communicated back to 
international forums. By stimulating interaction among high-
level stakeholders, including civilian and military government 
agencies, academia, businesses, civil society, internet provid-
ers, CERT and the technical community a network platform can 
achieve this synergy. This will help to move cybersecurity from 
ad hoc and bilateral agreements to the strategic and political 
level. A network platform that creates synergy between the 
parts may be based on an existing platform, or a new one can 
be created. What is crucial is that the network functions.
 
a) Create trust through sharing mechanisms  
Through mutual regular communication and information 
sharing, incentives for trust are established. The state, hav-
ing the most to gain from this mutual benefit, should take the 
first step by sharing information that the commercial actors 
need, thereby showing them that they too will gain from the 
cooperation.
 
b) Set clear goals
By establishing short- and long-term goals a network plat-
form can play a part in establishing political priorities. It is 
important to set these goals with technical backing and an 
understanding of the issues central to cybersecurity for all 
stakeholders. Heeding the diverse voices collected through 
the network is crucial. By setting the goals in these premises 
they function to clarify areas of responsibilities and enhance 
cooperation between the public and private sector on the 
strategic and political levels. 
c) Create framework for policy development
Cyberspace is developing rapidly which results in outdated 
policies. To avoid this frameworks should be created to serve 
as guidelines for the articulation of long-term policies and 
policy goals. Establishing such frameworks within the network 
platform enables the private sector to exert influence on policy. 
This works both as an incentive for the private sector to come to 
the table, and for them to abide by the policies created.
The functioning of the network platform
All actors in the network platform need to be involved on 
equal terms. The role of the state, as chief regulator and law 
enforcer, is to share information and coordinate and stimu-
late the network, whereas the private-sector actors function 
as main coordinators in creating goals and establishing a 
unified voice to present to the public sector and externally 
Private sector
• Unify a voice to communicate to 
the state to present externally/ 
internationally
• Influence policy through 
information sharing 
Government
• Coordinate, stimulate and regulate the 
network by defining simple but formal 
rules of governance
• Create framework conditions that allow 
the network to organize itself
• Balance the role of business and CEOs 
in its policies
• Publish and advertise successful results
• Regulate and legislate 
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in the international sphere. Through the network platform, 
members of the private sector can communicate and network 
amongst themselves, and share with the public sector their 
views on cybersecurity priorities, fostering the creation of 
a unified voice for international use. Information sharing 
allows for better transparency and cooperation, enabling 
greater coordination and administration of the many layers 
of distinct tasks concerning cyberspace. Sustainability of the 
network platform requires that the private sector continues 
to come to the table, to be heard and to influence policy. 
This can functions as an incentive for the private sector to 
use the platform as a decision-making arena, and to follow 
the policies agreed upon. The network platform provides a 
mechanism to include the private sector in international dis-
cussions on securing cyberspace. Unlike the ‘quick fix’ of the 
multistakeholder approach to cybersecurity, a network plat-
form can create a unified voice outwards:  a first step towards 
coordinated cooperation in securing cyberspace where all 
stakeholders take part. 
Conclusions
The idea of a multistakeholder approach to cybersecurity is 
not easily implemented in practice. To do so– according to 
the definition of a multistakeholder approach – would mean 
that all stakeholders take part on an equal footing in a proc-
ess that is open, inclusive and transparent. However, with so 
much of cyberspace in the hands of the private sector, com-
bined with the worries of security issues and economic risk 
that would follow such transparency around cybersecurity, 
this type of multistakeholder approach is neither viable nor 
realistic. For collaboration between the public and the pri-
vate sector to be continuous, lasting and functional, it must 
approach the premises of the private sector. The public sector 
must demonstrate to the private sector that it will gain from 
such cooperation – by creating incentives and trust through 
information sharing. Both the public and private sector must 
be involved, to ensure a coherent and cohesive cyber secu-
rity. A network platform for high-level representatives from 
the public and private sphere could promote communication 
between the public and private sectors, allowing coopera-
tion in securing cyberspace to be elevated to strategic and 
operational levels. This can reduce coordination problems 
regarding cooperation and create synergy. Building on exist-
ing cooperation, the network platform can enhance coor-
dination and lift it to a strategic level. Such a model is no 
quick-fix, silver bullet – but it is realistic and has potentials 
beyond the multistakeholder model.
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